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REACTIONS TO PERCEIVED INEQUITY IN U.S. AND DUTCH
INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
LISA K. SCHEER
University of Missouri—Columbia
NIRMALYA KUMAR
IMD—International Institute for Management Development
JAN-BENEDICT E. M. STEENKAMP
Tilburg University
In an empirical examination of inequity in interorganizational relationships, we found
similarities and differences in Dutch and U.S. automohile dealers' reactions to inequity
in their relationships with their automobile suppliers. As predicted by equity theory,
both positive and negative inequity have detrimental effects on the reactions of Dutch
firms. In contrast, U.S. firms do not react negatively to positive inequity; only negative
inequity has deleterious effects.
As firms increasingly rely on strategic alliances,
partnerships, and joint ventures (Oliver, 1990), it is
important to gain a better understanding of the
norms that are operative in interorganizational re-
lationships. This study focuses on one category of
relational norms, those that guide the assessment of
relationship outcomes, and one specific distribu-
tive norm. Interorganizational relationships create
value that partners cannot generate independently,
but there is tension between maximizing the cre-
ated value and distributing this value among the
partners (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). If one party thinks it
is not getting its fair share, it is more likely to be
hostile, distrust its partner, and end the relation-
ship. Knowledge of distributional norms is crucial
to understanding these reactions. Although man-
agement scholars have generally asserted that the
equity norm is important to the development of
stable, productive interorganizational relationships
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), an empirical examina-
tion of equity theory in these relationships has yet
to be conducted. We sought to determine if the
degree of inequity between a firm and a domestic
partner has an impact on their relationship—spe-
cifically, an impact on the firm's attitudes toward
that partner.
Equity theory was developed within a specific
cultural context, like other interorganizational the-
ories. As cultural standards of acceptable behavior
may limit the applicability of the equity norm (Ring
& Van de Ven, 1994), we examined interorganiza-
tional relationships in both the United States and
in the Netherlands, cultures in which reactions to
interorganizational inequity are expected to differ.
THEORY
Equity Theory
According to equity theory, a party evaluates an
ongoing relationship by assessing its own inputs to
the relationship and what it receives in return rel-
ative to what the other parties contribute to the
relationship and receive in return (Adams, 1965).
As "equity is in the eye of the beholder" (Walster,
Walster, & Berscheid, 1973: 152), evaluation in-
volves "perceived outcomes and inputs rather than
'objective' reality as conceived by a competent im-
partial observer" (Deutsch, 1985: 12; emphasis in
original). A firm experiences equity when it per-
ceives^ that the outcomes it and its partner receive
are proportional to their respective inputs to their
relationship. When the outcomes-to-inputs ratios
are unequal, inequity exists. The firm perceives
negative inequity if its own outcome-to-input ratio
is less than its partner's; the firm perceives positive
inequity if its own ratio exceeds that of its partner.
According to equity theory, a firm will react neg-
atively when it perceives any inequity, whether
negative or positive (Adams, 1965; Greenberg,
We gratefully acknowledge the many helpful com-
ments of Editor Thomas W. Lee, Associate Editor Harry
Barkema, and the three anonymous reviewers. All au-
thors contributed equally to this research.
^ It is, of course, individuals within a firm who expe-
rience and perceive phenomena; for simplicity, however,
we refer throughout to the perceptions of firms.
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1990). Positive inequity leads to guilt for not pull-
ing one's own weight or for receiving disproportion-
ately great outcomes; negative inequity leads to hos-
tility at being shortchanged or imdercompensated.
Inequity undermines relationship cohesion and ex-
pectations of continuity (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The
greater the inequity, the greater the distress and mo-
tivation to restore equity in a relationship or, alterna-
tively, to exit it in favor of one that is more equitable.
Despite the presumption that equity is critical for
healthy interorganizational relationships (e.g.. Ring
& Van de Ven, 1992, 1994), empirical evidence is
mixed (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). Some researchers
have argued that not all parties respond negatively to
positive inequity (Alwin, 1987; Hegtvedt, 1990; Huse-
man, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987). Why is this the case?
Although several factors may play a role, we focus on
the impact of national culture, which has been rec-
ognized as an important factor in shaping interorga-
nizational relationships (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen,
1997; Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & Dickson, 2000).
We examined interorganizational relationships
in two countries, the United States and the Nether-
lands, expecting differences in organizations' reac-
tions to inequity in the two countries. Our expec-
tation was based on Hofstede's (1980) research on
national cultures. The United States and the Neth-
erlands are similar on three of the four cultural
dimensions Hofstede identified: Both are relatively
high in individualism, moderately low in uncer-
tainty avoidance, and moderate in "power dis-
tance" (Hofstede, 1980). The United States and the
Netherlands differ substantially, however, along
the "masculinity" dimension; the United States ex-
hibits a greater competitive achievement orienta-
tion, while the Netherlands exhibits a greater com-
passionate egalitarian orientation. Given these
values, we anticipate that commercial interorgani-
zational relationships in the Netherlands will be
evaluated primarily by the equity principle and
that firms in the Netherlands will tend to respond
as predicted by classical equity theory. Dutch firms
will have negative reactions to both perceived pos-
itive and negative inequity. In contrast, we contend
that U.S. firms will tend to respond negatively only
to negative inequity. We examine the effects of
inequity on hostility and guilt, which are central
variables in equity theory, and on trust and rela-
tionship continuity, which are key indicators of the
health of an interorganizational relationship.
Effects of Negative Inequity
Negative inequity incites hostility in an under-
compensated firm, which resents its perceived out-
comes being below what they should be. In the
Netherlands, undercompensation violates norms
held dear—solidarity, service, cooperation, and
moral obligation. Negative inequity undermines
prediction-based trust, one of the primary mecha-
nisms through which trust is developed in egalitar-
ian cultures (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). An
undercompensated Dutch firm is likely to seek al-
ternatives and move to end the interorganizational
relationship within which the undercompensation
has occurred. Similarly, in the United States, the
emphasis on competition, achievement, and recog-
nition leads firms facing increasing negative ineq-
uity to react with greater hostility and investigation
of alternatives. The fact that a firm faces undercom-
pensation may lead it to conclude that the partner
does not have the firm's best interests at heart, a
conclusion that undermines its trust.
Thus, we hypothesize that both in Dutch interor-
ganizational relationships and in U.S. interorgani-
zational relationships, negative inequity will lead
to negative reactions, including hostility, distrust,
and lower relationship continuity. Guilt, which
plays a central role in positive inequity, should be
unaffected by negative inequity.
Hypothesis la. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative in-
equity increases, its hostility toward its partner
increases.
Hypothesis lb. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative
inequity increases, its trust in its partner
decreases.
Hypothesis Ic. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative
inequity increases, its relationship continuity
decreases.
Hypothesis Id. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative
inequity increases, its guilt regarding its role
in the relationship is not affected.
Hypothesis 2a. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative in-
equity increases, its hostility toward its partner
increases.
Hypothesis 2b. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative
inequity increases, its trust in its partner
decreases.
Hypothesis 2c. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative in-
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equity increases, its relationship continuity
decreases.
Hypothesis 2d. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived negative
inequity increases, its guilt regarding its role
in the relationship is not affected.
Note that we posit a null effect of negative ineq-
uity on guilt in both countries. Although we are
aware of the interpretational challenges null effects
pose, we offer null-effect hypotheses only to em-
phasize contrasts with the hypothesized direc-
tional effects. Within the context of the pattern of
all hypothesized effects, null effects offer some in-
sights. Figure 1 visually depicts our hypotheses.
Effects of Positive Inequity
That a firm will react negatively to undercom-
pensation is not controversial; negative reaction to
positive inequity is less intuitive. We submit that in
egalitarian societies that highly value cooperation,
compassion, consideration of others, social respon-
sihility, and conscious avoidance of trying to be
better than others (Hofstede, 1980), firms will pre-
fer negotiation, compromise, and the potential for
mutual gains (Steensma et al,, 2000), An overcom-
pensated Dutch firm therefore will experience guilt
for violating important values by not investing its
fair share of inputs into a relationship or by receiv-
ing excessive outcomes. The firm also knows that
its undercompensated partner is likely to terminate
the relationship or reduce its relational input in an
attempt to restore equity. On the other hand, if the
partner seemingly accepts negative inequity, the
firm will suspect that the partner is receiving more
rewards than is apparent to the firm. In either
event, a Dutch firm with perceived positive ineq-
uity will have suspicions about its partner's inten-
tions and doubts about its predictability, under-
mining both its trust (Doney et al., 1998) and
relationship continuity. Hostility, which is posited
to be affected by negative inequity, will be unaf-
fected by positive inequity.
We hypothesize that in achievement-oriented
cultures such as the United States, firms will not
respond negatively to positive inequity. In societies
that highly value competition, assertiveness, ac-
complishment, and conscious striving to he the
best (Hofstede, 1980), firms will view the world in
terms of winners and losers (Steensma et al,, 2000).
In contrast to the Dutch, U.S. firms will not express
FIGURE 1
Depiction of Hypotheses
The Netherlands United States
Negative Inequity
Positive Inequity
Hla-lc: Negative Reaction
(More hostility, less trust,
lower relationship
continuity)
.4^— H7a-7d: Similar — •
t
H5b and 5c: Similar"
;
H3b-3d: Negative Reaction
(Less trust, lower
relationship continuity,
more guilt)
•^— H8b-8d: Different'' — •
H2a-2c: Negative Reaction
(More hostility, less trust,
lower relationship
continuity)
t
H6a-6c; Different''
I
H4a-4d: No Reaction
Differences were expected only on hostility and guilt, each of which is affected negatively by only one type of inequity.
Similar (null) effects on guilt were expected,
^ Similar (null) effects on hostility were expected.
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guilt when perceiving positive inequity, but rather
will interpret the situation as validation of the unique
competencies, qualities, expertise, and value they
bring to their interorganizational relationship.
Consequently, we hypothesize that although
Dutch firms will react negatively to positive ineq-
uity, U.S. firms will not exhibit any specific reac-
tion to positive inequity.
Hypothesis 3a. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived positive in-
equity increases, its hostility toward its partner
is not affected.
Hypothesis 3b. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived positive
inequity increases, its trust in its partner
decreases.
Hypothesis 3c. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived positive
inequity increases, its relationship continuity
decreases.
Hypothesis 3d. In a Dutch interorganizational
relationship, as a firm's perceived positive in-
equity increases, its guilt regarding its role in
the relationship increases.
Hypothesis 4a. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, a firm's perceived positive ineq-
uity does not have an effect on its hostility
toward its partner.
Hypothesis 4b. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, a firm's perceived positive ineq-
uity does not have an effect on its trust in its
partner.
Hypothesis 4c. In a U.S. interorganizational
relationship, a firm's perceived positive ineq-
uity does not have an effect on its relationship
continuity.
Hypothesis 4d. In a U.S. interorganizational re-
lationship, a firm's perceived positive inequity
does not have an effect on its guilt regarding its
role in the relationship.
Within-Culture Similarities and Differences in
Inequity Effects
When faced with an increasingly inequitable re-
lationship, Dutch firms will have greater distrust
and lower relationship continuity, regar.dless of
whether they are overcompensated or undercom-
pensated. Therefore, the most stringent interpreta-
tion and the most comprehensive acceptance of the
equity norm in Dutch interorganizational relation-
ships would result in perceptions of inequity in
any configuration having similar, negative effects
on trust and relationship continuity. As negative
inequity is expected to impact hostility (hut not
guilt) and positive inequity is expected to affect
guilt (hut not hostility), positive and negative ineq-
uity will have different effects on guilt and hostility
for Dutch firms.
In contrast to Dutch firms' predicted negative
response to both types of inequity, U.S. firms will
respond negatively only to undercompensation.
U.S. firms thus are expected to react differently to
positive and negative inequity in terms of hostility,
trust, and relationship quality; no difference is ex-
pected on guilt, as null effects are posited for hoth
positive and negative inequity.
In summary, we hypothesize that Dutch firms
will have similar, negative reactions to both nega-
tive and positive inequity; differences will be
found only on hostility and guilt. In contrast, U.S.
firms are expected to have very different reactions
to negative and to positive inequity; their reactions
to the two types of inequity will only he similar in
the null effects on guilt.
Hypothesis 5a. In Dutch interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on hostility will be signifi-
cantly different.
Hypothesis 5b. In Dutch interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on trust will not be signifi-
cantly different.
Hypothesis 5c. In Dutch interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on relationship continuity
will not be significantly different.
Hypothesis 5d. In Dutch interorganizational
relationships, the effects of negative inequity
and positive inequity on guilt will be signifi-
cantly different.
Hypothesis 6a. In U.S. interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on hostility will be signifi-
cantly different.
Hypothesis 6b. In U.S. interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on trust will be significantly
different.
Hypothesis 6c. In U.S. interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
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positive inequity on relationship continuity
will be significantly different.
Hypothesis 6d. In U.S. interorganizational re-
lationships, the effects of negative inequity and
positive inequity on guilt will not be signifi-
cantly different.
Cross-Cultural Similarities and Differences in
Inequity Effects
Finally, we expect that Dutch and U.S. firms will
respond in the same way to negative inequity: un-
dercompensation is posited to have similar effects
in the Netherlands and in the United States on each
dependent variable. In contrast, we anticipate that
firms of these two countries will react very differ-
ently to positive inequity, with overcompensation
having different effects on trust, relationship con-
tinuity, and guilt. As hostility is hypothesized to be
unaffected by positive inequity, the effects on hos-
tility are expected to be the same (null) for both
Dutch and U.S. firms.
Hypothesis 7a. The effects of negative in-
equity on hostility will not be significantly dif-
ferent in U.S. and Dutch interorganizational
relationships.
Hypothesis 7b. The effects of negative inequity
on trust will not be significantly different in U.S.
and Dutch interorganizational relationships.
Hypothesis 7c. The effects of negative inequity
on relationship continuity will not be signifi-
cantly different in U.S. and Dutch interorgani-
zational relationships.
Hypothesis 7d. The effects of negative inequity
on guilt will not be significantly different in U.S.
and Dutch interorganizational relationships.
Hypothesis 8a. The effects of positive inequity on
hostility will not be significantly different in U.S.
and Dutch interorganizational relationships.
Hypothesis 8b. The effects of positive inequity
on trust will be significantly different in U.S.
and Dutch interorganizational relationships.
Hypothesis 8c. The effects of positive inequity
on relationship continuity will be significantly
different in U.S. and Dutch interorganizational
relationships.
Hypothesis 8d. The effects of positive inequity
on guilt will be significantly different in U.S.
and Dutch interorganizational relationships.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
We collected data from independent automobile
dealers in the United States and the Netherlands.
Given our focus on firms' perceived inequity and
attitudes toward their interorganizational relation-
ship partners, our unit of analysis was a dealer's
perspective regarding its relationship with its pri-
mary supplier. We used a mail questionnaire to
collect data from a single, key informant in each
dealership because in these businesses an owner-
manager often has sole responsibility for managing
the strategic aspects of the dealer-supplier relation-
ship (e.g., Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), Tele-
phone calls to 25 percent of our sample in each
country confirmed that the informants were the
people who most frequently interacted with the
suppliers and were the most knowledgeable about
their firms' dealer-supplier relationships (Kumar,
Stern, & Anderson, 1992). The titles held by the
informants, which included president, owner, and
general manager, also suggested that the informants
were appropriate sources of information.
In the United States, after deleting duplicate list-
ings and those with no contact name from a com-
mercial list of 2,100 new car dealers, we mailed
surveys with personalized cover letters to 1,640
automobile dealers in one midwestern state (Mis-
souri) and one eastern state (Pennsylvania). Fol-
low-up letters to nonrespondents were mailed four
weeks later. Questionnaires were received from 453
automobile dealers, for a response rate of 28 per-
cent. In the Netherlands, we mailed questionnaires
to a random sample of 1,600 dealers drawn from a
list of all 4,000 new car dealers in the country. As
no contact name was available for any of the Dutch
dealers, cover letters were not personalized and,
because of resource limitations, no follow-up let-
ters were mailed. The Dutch response rate was 19
percent, with 309 questionnaires returned. After
questionnaires with excessive missing data had
been eliminated, the final sample consisted of 417
U.S. dealers and 289 Dutch dealers.
In both countries, each dealer was asked to iden-
tify the automohile supplier whose product line
accounted for the largest share of his or her firm's
sales. This supplier was a manufacturer for most
U.S. dealers and an automohile importer for the
Dutch dealers. The major supplier accounted for,
on the average, 76.5 percent of a U.S. dealer's sales
and 67,1 percent of a Dutch dealer's sales (this
difference in percentages was significant at p <
.01). The average dealer accounted for 49,0 (United
States) and 41.6 percent (the Netherlands) of the
supplier's sales in its trading area (p < ,10).
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Measures
To enhance translation equivalence, we had the
original English questionnaire translated into
Dutch hy one person and then hack-translated into
English hy a second person. The two expert trans-
lators reconciled any differences that emerged.
Dependent variables. Four items assessing hos-
tility, anger, frustration, and resentment toward the
principal supplier of an informant (a dealer) mea-
sured hostility. Trust was measured with ten items,
five assessing the supplier's honesty arid five mea-
suring the supplier's benevolence (Larzelere & Hus-
ton, 1980; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Relationship
continuity was measured with a three-item scale
addressing the dealer's confidence that the rela-
tionship would continue. A single item assessed
the dealer's guilt when reflecting on the relation-
ship with the supplier. Given the difficulty of cap-
turing the unique nuances of guilt versus similar
constructs (such as shame), use of a single item is
relatively common (Hegtvedt, 1990).
Independent variables. We measured perceived
inequity with the four-item Walster Glohal Equity
Measure (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978),
which is based on Adams's original formulation of.
equity theory and is the most frequently used mea-
sure of inequity in interpersonal and organizational
research (e.g., Cate, Lloyd, Henton, & Larson, 1982;
Hegtvedt, 1990). Using seven-point scales (1 = "ex-
tremely low," 7 = "extremely high"), dealer infor-
mants indicated their perceptions of their firms'
contributions to the relationships, the suppliers'
contributions, the outcomes for their firms from the
relationships, and finally, the suppliers' relation-
ship outcomes. The degree of perceived inequity or
equity in an interorganizational relationship was
calculated by the following equation:
If
firm's outcomes partner's outcomes
firm's inputs partner's inputs
> 0, positive inequity;
= 0, equity;
< 0, negative inequity. (1)
See the Appendix for the measurement scales. Mea-
surement statistics can be found in Table 1.
Measurement Analysis
To ascertain that our measures were not culture-
bound, we examined the cross-national equiva-
lence in factor structure and the internal consis-
tency of the 18 items measuring our four dependent
constructs (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Us-
ing LISREL 8 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996), we con-
ducted hierarchical multigroup confirmatory factor
analyses on the covariance matrixes to examine
whether the measures' psychometric properties
exhibited an invariant pattern across the two
countries. By examining sequential models, we
evaluated whether imposing additional equality
parameter constraints across the countries resulted
in substantially inferior models. Table 2 presents
the descriptions and overall fit indexes for the four
measurement models estimated. The simplest
model, the equal structure model, assesses whether
imposing the same factor structure for the United
States and the Netherlands yields acceptable re-
sults. The overall fit of the equal structure model
was adequate, as the comparative fit index (CFI)
and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) passed the generally
accepted .90 cutoff. The model also demonstrated
TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, Coefficient Alphas, and Correlations"
1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
Variable
Inequity
Hostility
Guilt
Trust
Relationship
continuity
United States
Mean
-0,43
2,36
1,47
4,47
5,81
s.d.
0,93
1,03
0,78
1,26
1,08
Alpha
,87
,92
,62
The
Mean
-0,33
2,14
1,65
4,70
5,48
Netherlands
s.d.
0,70
0,94
0,83
1,06
1,19
Alpha
,87
,89
,62
1
_ 44***
,06
45***
21***
2
-,30***
,30***
_ 74***
— 42***
Correlations
3
,00
,40***
-,14**
-,10
4
34***
-,66***
- ,21***
,49***
5
,16**
-,47***
' -,16**
,54***
" Correlations from the United States appear below the diagonal, and correlations from the Netherlands appear above the diagonal.
Coefficient alphas are not available for inequity, as it is a computed variable, or for guilt, which is measured by a single item,
* * p < , 0 1
*** p < ,001
One-tailed tests.
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TABLE 2
Results of Hierarchical Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analyses"
Model df CFI TLI CAIC
1, Equal structure''
2, Equal loadings'^
3, Equal loadings and factor (co)variances''
4, Equal loadings, factor (co)variances, and error variances"
871,34
898,16
924,64
980,48
258
272
282
300
,91
,91
,91
,90
,90
,90
,90
,90
1,506,34
1,427,33
1,378,21
1,298,00
" CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis fit index, and CAIC = consistent Akaike information criterion,
^ The equal structure model (model 1) specified that the 18 items load on each of the four constructs as hypothesized for each country.
Although the measurement model estimated vi^ as constrained to have an identical factor structure across the two countries, the parameter
estimates were unconstrained or allowed to he idiosyncratic for each country,
•^  The equal loadings model (model 2) imposed an additional constraint on model 1 requiring that the factor loadings of the items to their
respective constructs he equal across the two countries,
'' The equal loadings and factor (co)variances model (model 3) imposed an additional constraint on model 2 requiring that the
(co)variances hetween the constructs be equal across the two countries,
° The equal loadings, factor (co)variances, and error variances model (model 4) imposed an additional constraint on model 3 that the
error variances be equal across the two countries.
convergent validity, as all factor "loadings" were
significant, with only one standardized item load-
ing less than .40; it also demonstrated adequate
discriminant validity, as all factor intercorrelations
were significantly helow unity [p < ,001), Contrast-
ing the other three, more constrained, models with
each other and with the equal structure model re-
vealed that imposing additional equality con-
straints across the two countries did not suhstan-
tially decrease the quality of the overall fit. The TLI
remains unchanged, and the CFI for the most con-
strained model is only a negligihle .01 worse than
the equal structure model. The consistent Akaike
information criterion, which incorporates a penalty
against "overfitting," improved as constraints were
added. We concluded that our measures showed a
high level of cross-national equivalence and that it
was therefore appropriate to contrast the relation-
ships among these constructs across the United
States and the Netherlands.
Spline Regression Analysis
To test our hypotheses, we needed an analysis
procedure that could split perceived inequity (as
calculated in Equation 1) and estimate separate,
potentially different effects for positive and nega-
tive inequity. Spline regression analysis (Johnston,
1984) allowed us to incorporate differences in the
nature of the inequity (see Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp [1998] for an application in an interor-
ganizational relationship context).
Using Equation 1, we created two spline inde-
pendent variahles, negative inequity and positive
inequity. When inequity exists, the appropriate
spline variahle reflects the nature and degree of that
inequity; the other spline variahle equals zero.
When equity is reported, hoth spline variahles
equal zero. For each dependent variahle, we esti-
mated the equation:
y = bo + b^ positive inequity
+ 62 negative inequity. [2]
The sign and significance of the regression coeffi- ,
cients b^ and 62 tested Hypotheses la-Id, 2a-2d,
3a-3d, and 4a-4d. Results from spline regression
analyses are reported in Tahle 3, To test Hypothe-
ses 5a-5d, 6a-6d, 7a-7d, and 8a-8d, we made
"pairwise" comparisons of regression coefficients
within and across countries with t-tests (Pedhazur,
1982), which are summarized in Tahle 4, Figure 2
depicts the findings,
RESULTS
Effects of Inequity
We hypothesized that Dutch firms would react
negatively to hoth perceived negative inequity (Hy-
potheses la-lc) and perceived positive inequity
(Hypotheses 3h-3d) as predicted hy classical equity
theory, while U.S. firms would respond negatively
to perceived negative inequity (Hypotheses 2a-2c)
hut not to perceived positive inequity (Hypotheses
4a-4d), Tests of these hypotheses are found in Ta-
hle 3, and the effects of positive and negative ineq-
uity on the various dependent variahles are graph-
ically depicted in Figure 2.
Effects of negative inequity. In the Netherlands,
as negative inequity increased, firms exhibited in-
creased hostility (.51, p < .001), lower trust (-.65,
p < .001), and lower relationship continuity (-.39,
p < .001). Guilt, as expected, was not affected hy
negative inequity (.07, p > .10). Hypotheses la - Id
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TABLE 3
Results of Spline Regression Analysis"
Variable
Negative inequity
Positive inequity
Intercept
Adjusted R^
United States: F(2, 414)
The Netherlands; F(2, 286)
Hypotheses
la-Id
2a-2d
3a-3d
4a-4d
Hostility
0,51***
(0,08)
0,42
(0,28)
1,92***
(0,06)
,12***
,12
19,63
The Netherlands
Trust
-0 ,65***
(0,09)
-0,47'*'
(0,30)
4,97***
(0,07)
,15***
,15
25,87
Relationship
Continuity
-0 ,39***
(0,11)
-0 ,66*
(0,36)
5,66***
(0,08)
,05***
,04
7,26
Guilt
0,07
(0,08)
0,52*
(0,26)
1,60***
(0,06)
,02*
,01
2,41
Hostility
0,55***
(0,05)
-0 ,12
(0,14)
2,10***
(0,05)
,21***
,21
55,15
United States
Trust
-0 ,67***
(0,07)
0,27
(0,17)
4,78***
(0,06)
,22***
,22
56,53
Relationship
Continuity
-0 ,25***
(0,06)
0,22
(0,16)
5,92***
(0,06)
.04***
,04
9,50
Guilt
-0 ,08^
(0,05)
-0 ,12
(0,12)
1,51***
(0,04)
,01^
,01
2,02
° Standard errors are in parentheses. We conducted a one-tailed test if a directional effect was hypothesized and a two-tailed test if not,
^ p < ,10
* p < ,05
* * * p < , 0 0 1
TABLE 4
Comparison of Regression Coefficients"
Difference in Effects of: Hypotheses Hostility Trust
Relationship
Continuity Guilt
Negative and positive inequity in the Netherlands
Negative and positive inequity in the United States
Negative inequity in the United States and Netherlands
Positive inequity in the United States and Netherlands
5a-5d
6a-6d
7a-7d
8a-8d
0,35
4,82***
0,40
1,72"^
0,59
5,32***
0,20
2,13*
0,75
2,76**
1,11
2,21*
1,76
0,28
1,59
2,27
" The (-values of the difference in the specific regression coefficients obtained from spline regression analysis (Table 3) are reported. For
the within-country comparisons (Hypotheses 5a-5d and 6a-6d), df's are 414 (United States) and 286 (the Netherlands); for the between-
country comparisons (Hypotheses 7a-7d and 8a-8d), dfs are 700, We conducted a one-tailed test if a directional effect was hypothesized
and a two-tailed test if not,
^ p < .10
*p < ,05
** p < ,01
*** p < ,001
were thus supported. In the United States, as neg-
ative inequity increased, dealers reported greater
hostility (.55, p < .001), lower trust (-.67, p <
.001), and lower relationship continuity (-.25, p <
.001), as predicted in Hypotheses 2a-2c. Although
we had hypothesized a null effect on guilt, our data
indicate that guilt decreased with greater negative
inequity (-.08, p < .10), suggesting that for U.S.
firms, high negative inequity dissipates whatever
guilt results from other elements in their interor-
ganizational relationships. In summary, negative
inequity was associated with negative reactions for
both Dutch and U.S. firms.
Effects of positive inequity. In the Netherlands,
as positive inequity increased, hostility was not
affected (.42, p > .10); trust (-.47, p < .10) and
relationship continuity (-.66, p < .05) decreased;
and guilt (.52, p < .05) increased. Hypotheses
3a-3d were thus supported. In the United States, as
predicted in Hypotheses 4a-4d, positive inequity
had no effect on hostility (-.12, p > .10), trust (.27,
p > .10), relationship continuity (.22, p > .10), or
guilt (-.12, p > .10). In summary, positive inequity
resulted in negative reactions for Dutch firms but
not for U.S. firms.
Similarities and Differences in Inequity Effects
Drawing on classical equity theory, we hypothe-
sized that Dutch firms would react negatively to
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FIGURE 2
Graphical Depiction of Effects of Negative and Positive Inequity"
Hostility TVust
Negative
Inequity
Negative
Inequity
t
:-«.'-'_
Equity
Continuity
/
Equity
The Netherlands
United States
Positive
Inequity
United States
The Netherlands
Positive
Inequity
Negative
Inequity
Negative
Inequity
__,--- United States
^ ^ The Netherlands
Equity Positive
Inequity
Guilt
/
^^ The Netherlands
United States
Equity Positive
Inequity
° Solid lines denote significant (p > .10) effects; dotted lines indicate insignificant effects.
both negative inequity and positive inequity exhib-
iting lower trust and relationship continuity (Hy-
potheses 5b and 5c]. Differences were expected on
two types of negative reactions (Hypotheses 5a and
5d): hostility, which was posited to be affected only
by negative inequity, and guilt, which was posited
to be affected only by positive inequity. In contrast,
we hypothesized that U.S. firms would respond
very differently to negative and positive inequity
(Hypotheses 6a-6c), with similarities only on guilt
(Hypothesis 6d], which was expected to be unaf-
fected by either type of inequity. The results of our
tests of these hypotheses are reported in Table 4.
As hypothesized in Hypotheses 5b, 5c, and 5d,
negative and positive inequity had similar effects
on Dutch firms' trust (t = 0.59, p > .10} and rela-
tionship continuity (t = 0.75, p > .10) and signifi-
cantly different effects on guilt (t = 1.76, p < .05).
Contrary to our expectation, negative and positive
inequity had a similar effect on hostility [t = 0.35,
p> .10). This result suggests that a Dutch firm that
perceives positive inequity will be suspicious of a
partner that tolerates undercompensation. This
finding also supports our basic contention that neg-
ative inequity and positive inequity will have sim-
ilar, negative effects on firms in Dutch interorgani-
zational relationships.
As hypothesized in Hypotheses 6a-6d, in the
United States, negative and positive inequity had
significantly different effects on hostility (t = 4.62,
p < .001), trust (t = 5.32, p < .001), and relation-
ship continuity (t = 2.76, p < .01), but not on guilt
(t = 0.28, p > .10). These findings support our
prediction that U.S. firms react differently to nega-
tive inequity than they do to positive inequity.
Cross-National Similarities and Differences
Finally, we hypothesized that negative inequity
would have similar, negative effects on both Dutch
firms and U.S. firms (Hypotheses 7a-7d), but that
positive inequity would have divergent effects on
firms in the two countries (Hypotheses 8b—8d).
Positive inequity was expected to have a similar,
null effect on hostility in both countries (Hypothe-
sis 8a). These results are reported in Table 4.
Supporting Hypotheses 7a-7d, negative inequity
had similar effects on hostility [t = 0.40, p > .10),
trust (t = 0.20, p > .10), relationship continuity (t =
1.11, p > .10), and guih (t = 1.59, p > .10) in both
the Netherlands and the United States. Conversely,
supporting Hypotheses 8b-8d, positive inequity
had divergent effects on trust (t = 2.13, p < .05),
relationship continuity (t = 2.21, p < .05), and guilt
(t = 2.27, p < .05) in the two countries. Positive
inequity also had significantly different effects on
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hostility (t = 1.72, p < .10) in the Netherlands and
the United States. While not predicted, this finding
further bolsters our primary contention: Dutch and
U.S. firms respond similarly to negative inequity
but differently to positive inequity.
DISCUSSION
Despite the critical role that equity plays in Ring
and Van de Ven's (1992, 1994) conceptual models,
empirical examination of interorganizational rela-
tionship inequity has been scant. Noting that their
models were based on research literature and a
small number of inductive observations. Ring and
Van de Ven called for further theoretical and em-
pirical work. Taking a first step in this direction,
we examined the effects of inequity on trust and
relationship continuity, key indicators of interor-
ganizational relationship health, and the effects of
inequity on guilt and hostility, central variables in
equity theory. Past equity studies have usually
been conducted in laboratory settings, where sub-
jects are unlikely to develop strong expectancies
about future rewards and where the dichotomy of
equity versus high inequity is manipulated (Green-
berg, 1987; Harder, 1992; Vecchio, 1982). In this
study, we measured perceived inequity as a contin-
uous variable over a wide range of values in ongo-
ing, naturally occurring interorganizational rela-
tionships in which inform^ants had well-formed
perceptions about their dealer-supplier relation-
ships and their future prospects.
This study makes a significant contribution by
demonstrating that one should not presume that
firms behave in line with the predictions of classic
equity theory. Our findings indicate that Dutch
firms, on the average, do react according to equity
theory predictions but that United States firms do
not. When undercompensated, Dutch firms experi-
ence hostility, and when overcompensated, they
experience guilt. In the face of inequity, either pos-
itive or negative, firms in the Netherlands exhibit
lower trust and relationship continuity. U.S. firms
react just as the Dutch do when faced with negative
inequity, but they do not react negatively to posi-
tive inequity. These findings suggest that it is dan-
gerous to presume that equity theory is universally
applicable to interorganizational relationships and,
specifically, to assume that positive inequity will
have deleterious effects. It should be noted that
some of the support for our theorizing is derived
from null effects. However, the meaningfulness and
the power in our study come from the overall pat-
tern of results (Figure 2), which is, in turn, repre-
sented by the linked hypotheses including direc-
tional and null effects.
This research examined one type of interorgani-
zational relationship and drew its U.S. sample from
only two states, circumstances that potentially
compromise the generalizability of the results to
other contexts. Further, the question of whether
nonrespondents differed systematically from the
firms represented in the study is not answered
here. In addition, the results for guilt and, to a
lesser degree, those for relationship continuity
must be interpreted in light of their low multiple
squared correlation coefficients (R^s). Despite the
low R^s, finding any statistically significant effects
for a construct like guilt in an interorganizational
relationship context is somewhat surprising. In ad-
dition, the low fl^-value for relationship continuity
may be a consequence of the scale used in this
study. We measured a firm's expectation that a
given supplier relationship would continue. Thus,
even if a firm strongly desired to maintain its rela-
tionship, it would report low relationship continu-
ity if it perceived that its partner was likely to seek
an alternative relationship. Future researchers
should consider whether this relationship continu-
ity construct is of interest or if other similar con-
structs, such as affective commitment or relational
investment, are of greater interest.
This study only scratches the surface of the fer-
tile research opportunities associated with out-
come distribution norms in interorganizational re-
lationships. One avenue for future research is a
deeper exploration of the effects of positive ineq-
uity in the United States. Examination of the regres-
sion results in Table 3 reveals that, although not
statistically significant, the sign of the effects of
positive inequity for each dependent variable in the
United States is the opposite of that in the Nether-
lands. This distinction suggests that at least some
U.S. firms in our sample reacted positively to pos-
itive inequity, exhibiting greater trust in the partner
and higher relationship continuity. Is this a realis-
tic possibility? How can U.S. firms in interorgani-
zational relationships react favorably to perceived
positive inequity if their partners simultaneously
experience negative inequity, with its associated
negative effects? We theorize that the answer may
lie with the focal outcomes U.S. firms consider in
equity assessment.
To assess the degree of inequity in an interor-
ganizational relationship, a firm must estimate its
own and its partner's relationship outcomes. JDJS-
tributable outcomes are those outcomes generated
through the relationship that can be allocated to
either the firm or its partner. For example, the total
"channel profit" on the retail sale of an automobile
(the net retail price minus the total costs incurred
by both an automaker and a selling dealer in the
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production, distribution, promotion, and sale) is
allocated between the dealer and the automaker
through the wholesale pricing mechanism. Distrib-
utable outcomes are a zero-sum game; any increase
in distributable outcomes for one participant en-
tails a corresponding decrease in outcomes for the
other party. In contrast, firm-specific outcomes and
partner-specific outcomes are those outcomes gen-
erated by a relationship that can only be received
by that specific relationship participant; the out-
comes are not transferable to the other relationship
partner, although they may be lost to or gained from
parties outside the focal firm-partner relationship.
Some specific outcomes are exclusive to one rela-
tionship partner. For example, a dealer's sales,
profits, and customer loyalty generated through its
service activities are dealer-specific outcomes that
are not transferable to the automobile manufac-
turer. Alternatively, some interorganizational rela-
tionship inputs may simultaneously generate favor-
able, nondistributable outcomes for both a firm
and a partner. For example, an automaker's brand
equity generates both favorable dealer-specific and
favorable automaker-specific outcomes. Although
the dealer benefits from its association with the
automaker, those benefits are not transferred from
the automaker; the manufacturer also benefits
from its brand equity and does not dilute its own
outcomes.
We theorize that national culture can impact
which of these types of outcomes are evaluated in
an equity assessment and that diverse reactions to
positive inequity in the United States and the Neth-
erlands may be explained by culturally based, sys-
tematically different approaches to the assessment
of equity. Egalitarian cultures such as the Nether-
lands would be likely to encourage interorgan-
izational relationship participants to consider all
interorganizational relationship outcomes when as-
sessing equity, including distributable outcomes
and both participants' specific outcomes. The
strong Dutch cultural imperative to pursue cooper-
ation, solidarity, and leveling will motivate inter-
organizational relationship participants to share
extensive information regarding each party's con-
tributions to a relationship and the outcomes each
receives through the relationship. Failure to do so
could result in a relational disparity in which one
participant receives excessive uncounted specific
outcomes, thereby violating the values of egalitar-
ian societies. In contrast, firms in the United States,
with its emphasis on individual achievement, are
likely to view their firm-specific outcomes as their
own business and as something they are not
obliged to disclose to their partner. As the partner's
specific outcomes are seen as the partner's concern.
U.S. firms are less motivated to invest time and
effort in discerning and evaluating their partner's
specific outcomes. Thus, we anticipate that in U.S.
interorganizational relationships, firms will focus
primarily on distributable relationship outcomes
and on their own firm-specific outcomes.
Note that if U.S. firms assess outcomes in this
manner, both participants in a dyad can simulta-
neously report positive inequity. Although a firm
and its partner both base their equity assessments
on their own and the other's outcomes, the precise
components of the focal outcomes each considers
would differ. Perceived positive inequity, in this
sense, may be derived largely from the receipt of
substantial firm-specific outcomes. Barring evi-
dence to the contrary, the U.S. firm will assume
that its partner is satisfied with what it has received
(that is, partner-specific outcomes plus the part-
ner's share of distributable outcomes). As the firm's
positive inequity is not perceived as being obtained
at the partner's expense, it will not induce guilt or
have negative effects on trust or relationship conti-
nuity. In contrast, if both parties in a Dutch inter-
organizational relationship do, in fact, base their
equity assessments on the same set of focal out-
comes, one firm will justifiably conclude that if it
experiences positive inequity, its partner inher-
ently faces negative inequity.
It is therefore possible that U.S. and Dutch firms
react differently to inequity not because U.S. firms
disregard equity considerations, but because they
adopt different perspectives for assessing interor-
ganizational relationship outcomes. Although our
findings are consistent with these proposed medi-
ating processes, we cannot test these possibilities
with our data. Our measures assessed firm and
partner outcomes at a general level, thereby permit-
ting the informants to include whatever focal out-
comes they deemed appropriate and relevant. To
examine the hypothesis that U.S. firms focus on
firm-specific and distributable outcomes in equity
assessment while Dutch firms focus on firm-
specific, distributable, and partner-specific out-
comes, more specific measures of outcome types
must be employed. In addition, only dyadic data
can determine if a firm and its partner simulta-
neously report positive inequity. Future research is
needed to examine these possibilities.
Even if the underlying national culture promotes
consistent relational norms, within any nation
there will be firms whose reactions deviate from
the predominant national cultural norm (Pennings,
1993). Another possible explanation for our results
is that in the U.S. interorganizational relationships
we studied, firms did not use the equity norm in
outcome fairness assessment. At least three other
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distributive norms may be relevant for interorgani-
zational relationships. Participants in these associa-
tions may adhere to an independence norm, whereby
neither ptirtner compares its own relationship out-
comes to its partner's outcome, although compari-
sons may be made to one's own inputs or to one's
previous outcomes. If an equality norm is applied, a
participant focuses solely on its own and its partner's
outcomes, ignoring inputs completely (Deutsch,
1985). An equitable equality norm dictates both
equality in outcomes and equality in inputs, thereby
simultaneously achieving both equity and equality
(Cate et al., 1982). Future research is needed to exam-
ine whether national cultural values do, in fact, pre-
dispose firms to generally accept and abide by spe-
cific norms in assessing relationship outcomes.
Interorganizational coordination is inherently
more complex when a relationship participant
deals with partners whose values and norms con-
flict with its own. The challenge is heightened
when dealing with partners from different coun-
tries with diverse values. One way managers can
make the ongoing interorganizational relationship
coordination process less arduous is by selecting
international partners whose inherent, disposi-
tional values and norms match those of their own
firm. In some cases, however, the prohlems result-
ing from having a partner that is out of step with its
national culture can outweigh the advantages. An
alternative strategy is to devise unambiguous poli-
cies regarding interorganizational relationship
norms and to screen potential partners for willing-
ness to adopt and abide by these norms regardless
of their inherent, dispositional preferences. This
strategy requires continuing efforts to inculcate,
nurture, and preserve a strong relational culture
supportive of those norms. Firms that have insuffi-
cient power to establish and enforce their preferred
relationship norms must play by their more domi-
nant partner's rules, as failure to agree upon the
norms that will be used to assess the fairness of its
outcomes can doom an interorganizational rela-
tionship. Research on the initiation, management,
and effectiveness of interorganizational relation-
ships composed of participants with diverse dis-
tributive norms is sorely needed.
Thus, a firm's distributive norms could vary
across its relationships. The firm may agree to pur-
sue equality in its closest alliances, yet apply the
equity norm in its interaction with other partners.
Research should examine the conditions under
which firms are willing to adopt new norms and
the extent to which relationship-specific norms can
be successfully cultivated. Future research could
also explore if firms from some national cultures
are more amenable to accepting and effectively op-
erating under a variety of relationship norms. An-
other potential moderating factor is environmental
munificence. When there is plenty, interorganiza-
tional relationship partners may be willing to pur-
sue equity, but when resources are scarce, equity
ideals could be jettisoned and the independence
norm could come to the fore.
This implies that a firm's equity preferences could
vary not only across its relationships, but also within
its relationship with a particular partner over time. To
examine whether, how, and why operative norms
vary among firms within a national culture, across
partners within a dyad, within a firm across its as-
sorted relationships, or within a specific firm-partner
relationship over time, future research must employ
methods to access and identify the operative under-
lying relational norms.
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APPENDIX
Measurement Items
Equity Components
All things considered, how would you evaluate your
firm's and the supplier's relative participation in this rela-
tionship? (1 = "extremely low," 7 = "extremely high")
1. Our firm's contributions to the relationship.
2. The supplier's contributions to the relationship.
3. The outcomes we receive from the relationship.
4. The outcomes the supplier receives from the relation-
ship.
Hostility
.When your firm reflects on the relationship with
the supplier, does your firm feel. . . (1 = "strongly feels
this way," 5 = "does not feel this way"; codings were
reversed)
1. hostility 2. anger 3. frustration 4. resentment
Trust (1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 = "strongly
agree")
Trust in Partner's Honesty
1. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely
explanation, we are confident that they are telling the
truth.
2. The supplier has often provided us information which
has later proven to be inaccurate, (reversed)
3. The supplier usually keeps the promises that they
make to our firm.
4. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our busi-
ness operations, we know that they are sharing their
best judgment.
5. Our organization can count on the supplier to be
sincere.
Trust in Partner's Benevolence
1. Though circumstances change, we believe that the
supplier will be ready and willing to offer us assis-
tance and support.
2. When making important decisions, the supplier is
• concerned about our welfare.
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3. When we share our problems with the supplier, we
know that they will respond with understanding.
4. In the future we can count on the supplier to consider
how its decisions and actions will affect us.
5. When it comes to things which are important to us, we
can depend on the supplier's support.
Relationship Continuity (1 = "strongly disagree," 7 =
"strongly agree")
1. We expect our relationship with the supplier to con-
tinue for a long time.
2. Renewal of relationship with the supplier is virtually
automatic.
3. It is unlikely that our firm will still be doing business
with this supplier in two years, (reversed)
Guilt
When your firm reflects on the relationship with the
supplier, does your firm feel guilt?
(1 = "strongly feels this way," 5 = "does not feel this
way"; codings reversed)
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